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CMU-CS-05-148
Computer Science Department
School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University
CMU-CS-05-148
FANFARE for the Common Flow
Elaine Shi, Bryan Parno, Adrian Perrig,
Yih-Chun Hun, Bruce Maggs
February 2005, Updated June 2005
CMU-CS-05-148.ps
CMU-CS-05-148.pdf
Keywords: Denial-of-Service, network infrastructure, capability,
flow
This paper presents FANFARE, a suite of infrastructure-based primitives
that empowers routers and receivers to secure and enforce various
flow-control mechanisms, such as per-flow admission control,
service differentiation, and congestion control, even in the face
of sophisticated attackers. In FANFARE, a sender must receive
capabilities from both a receiver and forwarding routers
in order to acquire a certain bandwidth allocation, thus empowering
both receivers and routers to control the rates of flows. FANFARE
provides strong incremental deployment properties; in particular,
FANFARE's automatic congestion response mechanism can protect a
downstream legacy link from being flooded by FANFARE traffic.
In FANFARE, routers use no per-flow state; they only need to
rely on local information to make decisions, and hence do not
have to trust other routers. FANFARE can be used to secure
several known architectures for managing flows. In this
paper, for example, we show how to use FANFARE to halt DDoS
attacks and to secure a Diffserv infrastructure.
23 pages
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